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Abstract
This note further characterizes the tacit collusion equilibria in the in-
vestment timing game of Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [1]. Tacit collusion
equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either fi-
nite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship
between equilibria and common demand forms is not immediately appar-
ent. We provide the full necessary and suﬃcient conditions for existence.
A simple condition on demand primitives is derived that determines the
type of equilibria. Common demand forms are then shown to illustrate
both finite-time and infinite-delay tacit collusion.
JEL classification: C73; D43; D92; L13.
Keywords: Real options; Duopoly; Collusion; Investment
1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux (henceforth BLM) study the
possible investment paths in a continuous time noncooperative Cournot duopoly.
Firms face market demand development uncertainty and may acquire lumpy ca-
pacity units at any point in time. Their work integrates both the more recent
“real options” methodology and a timing game à la Fudenberg and Tirole [3].
The authors find that, when firms are capacity constrained, preemptive equilib-
ria always exist, but tacit collusion equilibria in which both firms delay investing
over a finite period, or never invest, may also arise, depending on payoﬀs. This
note extends the work of BLM [1] by fully characterizing the conditions under
which one or the other type of (Pareto superior) collusive outcome may obtain
in equilibrium. These conditions are generally intricate, but we unveil a simple
criterion to discriminate between finite or infinite delay in collusive investment
choices that relates directly to the structure of demand. The easy applicability
of our conditions is illustrated by examples. Using common demand forms we
∗EMLYON Business School, Ecully, F-69134, France; ruble@em-lyon.com
†EMLYON Business School, Ecully, F-69134, France; and GATE, CNRS, Ecully, F-69130,
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show that, in the linear demand case, in all collusive equilibria firms abstain
from investing forever, and only by adding a curvature parameter do both types
of equilibria arise.
For the note to be self-contained, in Section 1 we briefly presents the model
in the same notation as the original paper. The conditions for tacit collusion
are provided in Section 2. Examples follow in Section 3.
2 The Model
We begin by describing (a case of) BLM’s model and essential results.1 Two
firms compete in quantities in a market with inverse demand Pt = YtD (Xt)
where Xt is total quantity, D (Xt) is positive, strictly decreasing, and strictly
concave, and the shock Yt follows a geometric Brownian motion, dYt = αYtdt+
σYtdWt, with Y0 > 0, α > 0 (growth rate), σ > 0 (volatility), and where (Zt)t≥0
is a standard Wiener process. The timing of the game is as follows: 1) given
the realization of Yt, and existing capital stocks, each firm chooses to invest a
number of “lumpy” capacity units; 2) given capacity units, each firm selects an
output level under capacity constraint; 3) given output levels, market price is
determined according to the inverse demand function.
Production is costless, so the optimal (unique and stable) per-period Cournot
output xc of each firm without capacity constraints is time-independent. Both
firms are initially capacity constrained with capital stock k ∈ N\{0} and each
of them may relax the constraint by investing in one additional unit. The end
of the investment game is near, in that xc − 1 ≤ k < xc. Firms decide non-
cooperatively (contracts are ruled out) and without commitment when to invest
in an additional unit of capacity at cost I. Let l = k + 1. When a firm has i
units of capacity while its rival has j units, its instantaneous variable profit is
denoted as Ytπij . Initially, with capacity k, both firms earn Ytπkk = YtD (2k) k.
When they both have capacity l, they may sell xc, so that Ytπll = YtD (2xc)xc.
Note that πlk > πkk > πkl, and πlk > πll > πkl.
Letting y ≡ Yt stand for the current demand shock, BLM establish that
the value of a firm f that invests immediately while its rival −f invests at the
threshold ykl > y is:
Lkk (y, ykl) =
πlk
r − αy − I +
µ
y
ykl
¶β
πll − πlk
r − α ykl,
where β = 12 − ασ2 +
h¡
1
2 − ασ2
¢2
+ 2r
σ2
i 1
2
> 1, and r > α is a constant interest
rate.2 (The latter inequality must hold true otherwise a firm’s value is maxi-
mized by postponing investments for ever.)
1BLM describe investment choices over the entire “tree” for firms that begin with no initial
capacity and may make multiple investments; our focus is on a subgame where both firms’
capacities are near the Cournot output.
2The expression of β is standard. See Dixit and Pindyck ([2], pp. 140-144) for a detailed
exposition of the steps that lead to it.
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A firm’s value from investing as a follower at ykl if its rival invests immedi-
ately at y < ykl is:
Fkk (y, ykl) =
πkl
r − αy +
µ
y
ykl
¶β µ
πll − πkl
r − α ykl − I
¶
.
Each firm may benefit from the growing demand by relaxing the capacity con-
straint before its rival. In the absence of commitment vis-à-vis investment
choices, competition for the lead position results in a preemption equilibrium,
in which one of the two firms — with equiprobability — invests before its rival. In
this case a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) is determined by two investment
triggers ypkk < y
∗
kl. The trigger y
p
kk denotes the preemption threshold. It is de-
fined implicitly as the smaller root of the equation Lkk (y
p
kk, y
∗
kl) = Fkk (y
p
kk, y
∗
kl),
where the larger root, y∗kl =
β
β−1
r−α
πll−πkl I = argmaxykl Fkk (y, ykl), is the opti-
mal follower threshold. Before y reaches ypkk, both firms earn Ytπkk. Between
ypkk and y
∗
kl, the leading firm f earns Ytπlk, while firm −f earns Ytπkl. Both
firms earn Ytπll when y ≥ y∗kl.
Firms may also coordinate investment choices. The value, measured at y,
if both firms invest simultaneously at the (possibly infinite) joint investment
threshold y¯kk > y is:
Skk (y, ykk) =
πkk
r − αy +
µ
y
y¯kk
¶β µ
πll−πkk
r − α y¯kk − I
¶
.
With the privately optimal simultaneous investment trigger yskk, firms’ payoﬀ is
S∗ ≡ Skk (y, yskk).
3 Conditions for Tacit Collusion
Preemption equilibrium investment triggers (ypkk, y
∗
kl) always exist, but as BLM
show, either simultaneous investments at a finite or infinite yskk may constitute
a Pareto dominant MPE. More formally:
Proposition 1 (BLM [1]) Suppose Y0 ≤ ypkk :
1. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for a tacit collusion MPE to exist is:
S∗ ≥ L (y, y∗kl) , ∀y ≤ y∗kl. (1)
If this inequality is strict, there exists a continuum of tacit collusion MPEs.
From the firms’ point of view, these MPEs are Pareto ranked.
2. The Pareto optimal simultaneous investment threshold is either given by
yskk =
β
β−1
r−α
πll−πkk I = argmaxykk S (y, ykk) if πll > πkk (type 1 collusion),
or infinite otherwise (type 2 collusion).
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The existence of the tacit collusion equilibrium therefore depends on the
function S∗. Note that although (1) is very general as it does not refer explic-
itly to instantaneous profits, it may be expressed diﬀerently depending on the
comparison of πkk with πll, since:
S∗ =
(
πkk
r−αy +
³
y
yskk
´β ³
πll−πkk
r−α y
s
kk − I
´
if πll > πkk;
πkk
r−αy otherwise.
(2)
With some algebra, the necessary and suﬃcient condition (1) may be expressed
as follows:
Proposition 2 (Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for collusive equilibria) Sup-
pose Y0 ≤ ypkk :
1. A type 1 Pareto optimal collusion equilibrium exists if (BLM) and only if
πll > πkk and:
(πlk − πkk)β ≤ (πlk − πkk) (πll − πkk)β−1+(β − 1) (πlk − πll) (πll − πkl)β−1 .
(3)
2. A type 2 Pareto optimal collusion equilibrium exists if and only if πll ≤ πkk
and:
(πlk − πkk)β ≤ β (πlk − πll) (πll − πkl)β−1 . (4)
Proof. (see Appendix)
BLM state the suﬃcient condition (3), but necessity is more elaborate to es-
tablish. In addition, Proposition 2 provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for type 2 collusion.
Conditions (3) and (4) do not have obvious economic interpretations, but
on the other hand we can remark that, when a Pareto optimal tacit collusion
equilibrium exists, its nature hinges on the sign of the diﬀerence πll − πkk, and
this diﬀerence can be related simply to the demand primitive. We establish that
the sign of this diﬀerence actually depends on the straightforward comparison
of the initial stock of capital, k, with a critical level of output, x∗, which is
the unique quantity strictly lower than xc satisfying D (2x∗)x∗ = D(2xc)xc.
Existence and uniqueness of x∗ result from the strict concavity of D (Xt). On
the basis of this, we can oﬀer a characterization of the type of Pareto optimal
tacit collusion equilibria in the model, as follows.
Proposition 3 (Discrimination of collusive equilibria) Suppose Y0 ≤ ypkk. The
Pareto optimal collusive equilibrium is of type 1 (type 2) if and only if:
x∗ > (≤) k. (5)
4
Proof. (⇐) For all x¯ < x∗ the definition of x∗ implies D (2x¯) x¯ < D(2x∗)x∗ =
D(2xc)xc. Then pick x¯ = k, to obtain πkk < πll.
(⇒) We have X ≡ xf + x−f . As D (X)xf is strictly concave, D (2k) k <
D(2xc)xc implies either k > xc, which is ruled out by assumption, or (exclusively
so) k < x∗.
This result completes the analysis in BLM by identifying an easy to use
criterion that determines the type of collusion. The intuition is very clear. If
the capacity constraint is very severe (x∗ > k) in that firms’ instantaneous joint
profit is less than in the unconstrained Cournot case, it pays to invest more
in a collusion equilibrium. Otherwise firms find it profitable to stop investing
in order to earn superior profits at each point in time forever. Remark that
k = dxce−1N(xc), by assumption, so that the condition k < x∗ is equivalent to
comparing the integer component of xc, minus 1 only if xc is natural, with x∗.
BLM focus on type 1 equilibria, but type 2 equilibria are also noteworthy
from an industrial organization perspective. When x∗ ≤ k and (4) hold, the
dynamic collusion equilibrium in investment choices mimics a static collusive
outcome in quantities, despite instantaneous Cournot competition. The greater
the pre-installed capacity k relative to Cournot output, the greater the likelihood
of infinite delay.
4 Examples
We now study the applicability of Propositions 2 and 3 to diﬀerent demand
functions. To begin with, consider the common linear specification.
Example 1 Suppose that P (X) = a− bX, with a, b > 0.
Firm f ’s profit function is πf (xf , x−f ) = (a− b (xf + x−f ))xf . For type 1
collusion to occur, we know from Proposition 3 that x∗ > k is necessary. In
this linear setup, it is easy to check that this condition is incompatible with
the model’s main assumptions, namely that the game is near its end, that is
xc − 1 ≤ k, and that capacity units are lumpy, so that k ≥ 1.
Claim 4 In the case of linear demand, collusive equilibria are always of type 2.
Proof. By Proposition 3, type 1 collusion arises if x∗ > k. With P (X) = a−bX,
we have xc = 13
a
b and it is direct to compute x
∗ = 16
a
b . By assumption, the lumpy
pre-installed capacity must satisfy k ≥ 1, and the near end condition imposes
xc− 1 ≤ k. This latter condition implies that 13 ab ≤ k+1 ≤ 2, so 16 ab ≤ 1, hence
x∗ ≤ k.
It follows that the linear specification is limited as an illustration of BLM’s
full analysis of tacitly collusive investment decisions. However, by considering
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a broader class of demand functions, we can illustrate all the possible cases of
Propositions 2 and 3.
Example 2 Suppose that P (X) = a− bXδ, δ > 0, and let a = 4δ
¡
1 + δ2
¢
b.
Consider the case where k = 1, l = 2, as in BLM.3 Here the specific choice
of a implies that xc = 2, and allows us to focus on the role of the curvature
parameter δ. By means of Propositions 2 and 3 above, we can completely
characterize in terms of the parameters β and δ the collusive equilibria for this
family of demand functions. To begin with, by Proposition 3:
Claim 5 The collusive equilibrium, if it exists, is of type 1 (type 2) if and only
if δ > (≤) 1.
Proof. Simple computation establishes that π (xc, xc) =
¡
a− b4δ
¢
2 = δ4δb.
The critical output x∗ that solves π (x∗, x∗) = π (xc, xc) satisfies (a−2δbx∗δ)x∗ =
δ4δb. Substituting 4δ
¡
1 + δ2
¢
b for a, we get x∗ as the lower root of:
fδ(z) ≡ −2δzδ+1 + 4δ
µ
1 +
δ
2
¶
z − δ4δ,
where fδ(z) is concave in z over R+ and has xc = 2 as its upper root. If
fδ(1) < 0, then x∗ > k and collusion is of type 1 (conversely, if fδ(1) ≥ 0,
x∗ ≤ k and collusion is of type 2). It is then suﬃcient to identify the roots of:
fδ(1) ≡ 2δ
µ
1− δ
2
¶
− 1,
where fδ(1) is a concave function of δ over R+. The two roots are δ = 0 (which
is non admissible) and δ = 1. For δ > 1 (≤ 1), fδ(1) < 0 (≥ 0) and collusion is
type 1 (type 2).
It is interesting to remark that the linear demand form of Example 1 exactly
constitutes a limiting case of type 2 collusion with the specification that δ = 1
in Example 2. Here the type 1 collusion that BLM focus on may occur only if
demand satisfies their assumption of strict concavity, that is δ > 1.
The two conditions of Proposition 2 are checked by directly calculating the
profits π11, π12, π21, and π22. As a result, we are able to numerically partition
the parameter space in (β, δ) (the magnitude of b has no impact on the relative
profits at diﬀerent investment levels). The results are plotted in Figure 1 for
the values β ∈ (1, 3] and δ ∈ (1/2, 3/2] where all four possible scenarios (type
1/type 2 collusion, existence/nonexistence) arise.
3Note that, although this demand does not satisfy the strict concavity assumption made
by BLM for δ ≤ 1, the proofs of our propositions remain valid with this specification.
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Figure 1: In Example 2, there is type 1 collusion in region I (points on the
frontier δ = 1, that correspond to the linear case, are excluded). There is type
2 collusion in region II.
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Appendix
Before proving Proposition 2, we establish the following lemma:4
Lemma 1 Under the assumptions of the model, if πll > πkk, then πlk + πkl >
πll + πkk.
Proof. Define π
¡
xf , x−f
¢
≡ D
¡
xf + x−f
¢
xf , and let ex = argmaxx≤l π (x, k).
Then, πlk + πkl = π (ex, k) + π (k, ex) ≡ Π (ex+ k), where Π (X) denotes in-
dustry profit. Let Xm denote the monopoly quantity. First, suppose thatex + k < Xm. Because π ¡xf , x−f¢ is strictly submodular (we have D0 < 0),
πll + πkk = π (x
c, xc) + π (k, k) < π (xc, k) + π (k, xc) = Π (xc + k), and since
xc + k ≤ ex + k and industry profit is increasing to the left of Xm, we have
πll + πkk < Π (x
c + k) ≤ Π (ex+ k). Otherwise, suppose that ex+ k ≥ Xm. Let
x∗(k) = argmaxx∈R+ π (x, k), where x
∗(k) is the unconstrained best-response
to k. Because
¯¯¯
∂x
f∗
∂x−f
¯¯¯
< 1 it must be that x∗(k) + k < 2xc. Since ex ≤ x∗(k) we
have ex+k < 2xc. As ex+k ≥ Xm, industry revenue is decreasing to the right ofex+k, soΠ (ex+ k) ≥ Π (2xc). Finally, Π (2xc) = 2π (xc, xc) > π (xc, xc)+π (k, k)
when πll > πkk. Therefore Π (ex+ k) > π (xc, xc) + π (k, k) = πll + πkk.
Proof of Proposition 2
(1) By Proposition 1, and (2), a collusive equilibrium exists if and only if S∗−
L (y, y∗kl) ≥ 0, ∀y ≤ y∗kl, where S∗ − L (y, y∗kl) is written as:
πkk − πlk
r − α y + I +
µ
y
yskk
¶β µ
πll − πkk
r − α y
s
kk − I
¶
+
µ
y
y∗kl
¶β
πlk − πll
r − α y
∗
kl,
with yskk =
β
β−1
r−α
πll−πkk I and y
∗
kl =
β
β−1
r−α
πll−πkl I. The function S
∗−L (y, y∗kl) is
convex in y, strictly positive and decreasing at 0 (BLM). It is non-negative on
the interval [0, y∗kl] if and only if either (i) it has a non-positive derivative and
a non-negative value at y∗kl, or (ii) its minimum value over R+ is non-negative.
4The same reasoning also holds for the potentially convex demand in Example 2.
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We know from BLM that the latter condition holds if and only if (3) holds. We
show that the former condition cannot hold. To see that, compute the derivative
of S∗ − L (y, y∗kl) w.r.t. y, that is:
−πlk − πkk
r − α + β
µ
y
yskk
¶β−1µ
πll−πkk
r − α −
I
yskk
¶
+ β
µ
y
y∗kl
¶β−1
πlk − πll
r − α .
Evaluated at y∗kl, this gives:
(β − 1) (πlk − πll) + πkk − πll
r − α +
πll−πkk
r − α
µ
πll − πkk
πll − πkl
¶β−1
,
which is non-positive if:
(πll − πkk)β ≤ (πll − πkl)β−1 [βπll − πkk − (β − 1)πlk] .
The value of S∗ − L (y, y∗kl) at y∗kl is:
− β
β − 1
πlk − πkk
πll − πkl
I + I +
1
β − 1I
µ
πll − πkk
πll − πkl
¶β
+
β
β − 1
πlk − πll
πll − πkl
I,
which is non-negative if:
(πll − πkl)β−1 [πll − βπkk + (β − 1)πkl] ≤ (πll − πkk)β .
Therefore, for a non-positive derivative and a non-negative value at y∗kl, the
following two conditions must hold jointly:(
(πll − πkk)β ≤ (πll − πkl)β−1 [βπll − πkk − (β − 1)πlk]
(πll − πkl)β−1 [πll − βπkk + (β − 1)πkl] ≤ (πll − πkk)β
.
However, this implies that:
πlk + πkl ≤ πll + πkk,
violating Lemma 1. Hence S∗−L (y, y∗kl) cannot have both a non-positive deriv-
ative and a non-negative value at y∗kl. Consequently, it is non-negative on the
interval [0, y∗kl] if and only (3) holds.
(2) In this case, S∗ − L (y, y∗kl) is written as:
−πlk − πkk
r − α y + I +
µ
y
y∗kl
¶β
πlk − πll
r − α y
∗
kl,
with still y∗kl =
β
β−1
r−α
πll−πkl I, and the derivative of S
∗ − L (y, y∗kl) w.r.t. y is:
−πlk − πkk
r − α + β
µ
y
y∗kl
¶β−1
πlk − πll
r − α .
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As above, S∗ − L (y, y∗kl) is a convex function of y that is strictly positive and
strictly decreasing at the origin. Let us first study the behavior of S∗−L (y, y∗kl)
at y∗kl. The derivative at y
∗
kl has the sign of:
(β − 1)πlk + πkk − πll > 0,
meaning that the minimum of S∗ − L (y, y∗kl) always lies in [0, y∗kl). Note inci-
dentally that S∗−L (y, y∗kl) is always positive at y∗kl. A tacit collusion equilibrium
therefore exists if and only if the value of S∗−L (y, y∗kl) at this minimum in non-
negative. The derivative is zero when y =
³
1
β
πlk−πkk
πlk−πll
´ 1
β−1
y∗kl. The minimized
value is then:
− β
β − 1
πlk − πkk
πll − πkl
I
µ
1
β
πlk − πkk
πlk − πll
¶ 1
β−1
+
1
β − 1
πlk − πkk
πll − πkl
I
µ
1
β
πlk − πkk
πlk − πll
¶ 1
β−1
+I,
which is non-negative if and only if:
(1− β)
µ
1
β
πlk − πkk
πlk − πll
¶ 1
β−1
+ (β − 1) πll − πkl
πlk − πkk
≥ 0,
or equivalently:
β (πlk − πll) (πll − πkl)β−1 ≥ (πlk − πkk)β .
¥
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